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Abstract
We study a heterogeneous routing game in which vehicles might belong to more than one
type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of
various types of vehicles over that edge. We relax the assumptions needed for the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in this heterogeneous routing game. We extend the available results to present
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a potential function. We characterize a
set of tolls that guarantee the existence of a potential function when only two types of users
are participating in the game. We present an upper bound for the price of anarchy (i.e., the
worst-case ratio of the social cost calculated for a Nash equilibrium over the social cost for a
socially optimal flow) for the case in which only two types of players are participating in a game
with affine edge cost functions. A heterogeneous routing game with vehicle platooning incentives
is used as an example throughout the article to clarify the concepts and to validate the results.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Routing games are of special interest in transportation networks [2–4] and communication net-
works [5–7] because they allow us to study cases in which a desirable global behavior (e.g., achieving
a socially optimal solution) can emerge from simple local strategies (e.g., imposing tolls on each road
based on only local information). For the purpose of this article, routing games can be decomposed
into two categories. In the first category, namely, homogeneous routing games, drivers or vehicles are
of the same type and, therefore, experience the same cost when using an edge in the network. Such
an assumption is primarily motivated by transportation networks for which the drivers only worry
about the travel time (and indeed under the assumption that all the drivers are equally sensitive to
latency through considering their average behavior) or packet routing in communication networks
where all the packets that are using a particular link experience the same delay or reliability. In
the second category, namely, heterogeneous routing games (a.k.a., multi-class routing games [8, 9]),
drivers or vehicles belong to more than one type due to the following reasons:
- Fuel Consumption: In a transportation network, if we include the fuel consumption of the
vehicles in the cost functions, two vehicles (of different types) may experience different costs
for using a road even if their travel times are equal. For instance, [10] studied this phenomenon
in atomic congestion games in which heavy-duty vehicles experience an increased efficiency
when a higher number of heavy-duty vehicles are present on the same road, because of a
higher possibility of platooning and, therefore, a higher fuel efficiency, while such an increased
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efficiency may not be true for cars. For an experimental study of improvements in the fuel
efficiency caused by platooning in heavy-duty vehicles, see [11].
- Sensitivity to Latency: It is known that drivers on a road have different sensitivities to the
latency under different circumstances as well as depending on their personality and back-
ground [12, 13]. In addition, due to economic advantages, heavy-duty vehicles might be more
sensitive to latency in comparison to cars (because they need to deliver their goods at specific
times).
- Sensitivity to Tolls : Drivers generally react differently to road tolls, e.g., based on the reason
of the trip or their socioeconomic background. For instance, in 2001, by the request of the
Swedish Institute for Transport and Communications Analysis, the consulting firm Inregia
compiled a survey to estimate the value of time for the drivers in Stockholm [14]. According
to that study, drivers valued their time as 0.98, 3.30, and 0.19 SEK/min for work and school
commuting trips, business trips, and other trips, respectively.
These examples motivate our interest for studying heterogeneous routing games in which the drivers
or the vehicles might belong to more than one type and their type determines the cost of traveling
along an edge as a function of the flow of all types of vehicles over that edge.
1.2 Related Work
In the context of transportation networks, routing games were originally studied in [3]. This study
also formulated the definition of Nash equilibrium in routing games1. Later, [17] showed that under
some mild conditions, the routing game admits a potential function and the minimizers of this
potential function are Nash equilibria of the routing game. This result guarantees the existence of a
Nash equilibrium for the routing game. The problem of bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria
has been extensively studied; see [15, 18–22] for a survey of these results.
Heterogeneous routing games have been studied extensively over the past starting with pioneering
works in [8, 9]. In these studies, a routing game with multi-class users were introduced and the
definition of equilibrium was given. Furthermore, in [9], the author introduced a sufficient condition
for transforming the problem of finding an equilibrium to that of an optimization (i.e., equivalent
to the existence of a potential function [23, 24]). The sufficient condition is that over each edge, the
increased cost of a user of the first type due to addition of one more user of the second type is equal
to the increased cost of a user of the second type due to addition of one more user of the first type,
i.e., the users of the first and the second type influence each other equally [9]. This condition was
considered later in [25] in which it was also noted that satisfaction of this symmetry condition may
depend on the units (e.g., time or money) adopted for representing the cost functions for the case in
which the users’ types are determined by their value of time (i.e., a scalar factor that balances the
relationship between the latency and the imposed tolls). This results is of special interest since the
equilibrium does not change by using different units for the cost functions (if the latency only depends
on the sum of the flows of various types over the edge, not the individual flows, and the value of time
appears linearly in the cost functions) [26]. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
potential functions in games with finite number of players was recently investigated in [27]; however,
these results were not generalized to games with a continuum of players as in heterogeneous routing
games. The authors in [28] studied the existence of an equilibrium in heterogeneous routing games
even if such a symmetry condition does not hold. In contrast to these articles that assumed a finite set
of types to which the users may belong, a wealth of studies also considered the case in which the users
may belong to a continuum of types [29, 30]. The problem of finding tolls for general heterogeneous
routing games as well as the case in which types of the users is determined by their value of time
have been considered extensively [31–36]. For instance, in [31], the problem of determining tolls on
each edge or path for heterogeneous routing games was studied. Guarantees were provided for that
the socially optimal solution (also referred to as system-optimizing flow [9]) is indeed an equilibrium
of the game. However, in that article, the users were assumed to be equally sensitive to the imposed
tolls. The problem of finding optimal tolls for routing game in which the users’ value of time belongs
to a continuum was studied in [32].
1 Throughout this article, following the convention of [15, 16], we use the term Nash equilibrium to refer to this
equilibrium. See Remark 2.1 for more information regarding this matter.
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1.3 Contributions of the Article
In this article, we formulate a general heterogeneous routing game in which the vehicles2 might
belong to more than one type. The vehicle’s type determines the mapping that specifies the cost for
using an edge based on the flow of all types of vehicles over that edge.
We prove that the problem of characterizing the set of Nash equilibria for a heterogeneous routing
game is equivalent to the problem of determining the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a
game with finitely many players (in which each player represents one of the types in the original
heterogeneous routing game). Doing so, we can employ classic results in game theory and economics
literature, specially regarding the existence of an equilibrium in games and abstract economies [37,38]
(which is an extension of games to a situation where the actions of other players can modify the set
of feasible actions for a player), to show that under mild conditions, a heterogeneous routing game
admits at least one Nash equilibrium.
Then, we present a necessary condition for the existence of a potential function for the heteroge-
neous routing game. We show that this condition is also sufficient for the case in which only two types
of players are participating in the routing game. In this case, we show, following the potential game
literature [23], that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in the heterogeneous routing game
can be posed as an optimization problem (which is numerically tractable if the potential function is
convex). Motivated by the sufficient condition, in the rest of this article, we focus on heterogeneous
routing games in which only two types of users are participating. Note that in contrast to the results
of [9,25], here, we present a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of potential function
through which minimization we can recover an equilibrium. However, the price of providing this
tighter condition is that we can only treat routing games with two distinct types contrary to the
sufficient condition in [9, 25].
If the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in the heterogeneous routing game is numerically
intractable3, it might be unlikely for the drivers to figure out a Nash equilibrium in finite time (let
alone an efficient one) and utilize it. This might result in inefficient utilization of the transportation
network resources. Therefore, we present a set of tolling policies for distinguishable types (i.e., a
routing game in which we may impose different tolls for different user types) and indistinguishable
types (i.e., when we cannot impose type-dependent tolls) to guarantee the existence of a potential
function for heterogeneous routing games. The idea of proposing tolls for indistinguishable types has
been previously studied in [42]. However, in that study, the tolls were introduced to minimize the total
travel time and the total travel cost (as a bi-objective optimization problem). In addition, in [42],
the users’ types corresponded to socio-economic characteristics and, therefore, the cost functions of
various types of users were the latency (which the function of the total flow and not individual flows
of each type) plus the tolls multiplied by the value of time.
Finally, because a Nash equilibrium is typically inefficient (i.e., it does not minimize the social
cost function4), we study the price of anarchy5 (a measure of the inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium
which can be defined as the worst-case ratio of the social cost at a Nash equilibrium over the social
cost at a socially optimal flow). We prove that for the case in which a convex potential function
exists, the price of anarchy is bounded from above by two for affine edge cost functions, that is, the
social cost of a Nash equilibrium can be at most twice as much as the cost of a socially optimal
solution.
1.4 Article Organization
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We formulate the heterogeneous routing game in
Section 2. In Section 3, we prove that a Nash equilibrium may indeed exist in this routing game. We
present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee the existence of a potential function in
Section 4. In Section 5, a set of tolling policies is presented to satisfy the aforementioned conditions.
2We use the terms players, drivers, users, and vehicles interchangeably to denote an infinitesimal part of the flow
that strategically tries to minimize its own cost for using the road.
3In general, the problem of finding a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is not numerically tractable; e.g., [39–41].
4We use a utilitarian social cost function (i.e., summation of the individual cost functions of all the players) as
opposed to a Rawlsian social cost function (i.e., the worst-case cost function of the players); see [43, p. 413] for more
information regarding the difference between these two categories of social cost functions. We present the definition
of the social cost function in Section 6.
5The notion of price of anarchy was first introduced in [44, 45]. Later, it was utilized in various games including
routing games [15, 18, 46–48].
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We bound the price of anarchy for affine cost functions in Section 6. A numerical example motivated
by a heterogeneous routing game with platooning incentives is studied in Section 7. Finally, we
conclude the article and present directions for future research in Section 8.
2 A Heterogeneous Routing Game
2.1 Notation
Let R and Z denote the sets of real and integer numbers, respectively. Furthermore, define Z≥(≤)a =
{n ∈ Z |n ≥ (≤)a} and R≥(≤)a = {x ∈ R |x ≥ (≤)a}. For simplicity of presentation, let N = Z≥1.
We use the notation JNK to denote {1, . . . , N}. All other sets are denoted by calligraphic letters.
Specifically, Ck consists of all k-times continuously differentiable functions.
Let X ⊆ Rn be a set such that 0 ∈ X . A mapping f : X → R is called positive definite if f(x) ≥ 0
for all x ∈ X .
A set-valued mapping f : X ⇒ Y is said to be continuous at x0 ∈ X if for every y0 ∈ f(x0)
and every sequence {xk}k∈N such that limk→∞ xk = x0, there exists a sequence {yk}k∈N such that
yk ∈ f(xk) for all k ∈ N and limk→∞ yk = y0.
We use the notation G = (V , E) to denote a directed graph with vertex set V and edge set
E ⊆ V × V . Each entry (i, j) ∈ E denotes an edge from vertex i ∈ V to vertex j ∈ V . A directed
path of length z from vertex i to vertex j is a set of edges {(i0, i1), (i1, i2), . . . , (iz−1, iz)} ⊆ E such
that i0 = i and iz = j.
2.2 Problem Formulation
We propose an extension of the routing game introduced in [3] to admit more than one type of
players. To be specific, we assume that the type of a player θ belongs to a finite set Θ.
Let us assume that a directed graph G = (V , E) models the transportation network and that a
set of source–destination pairs {(sk, tk)}Kk=0 for some constant K ∈ N are given. Each pair (sk, tk)
is called a commodity. We use the notation Pk to denote the set of all admissible paths over the
graph G that connect vertex sk ∈ V (i.e., the source of this commodity) to vertex tk ∈ V (i.e., the
destination of this commodity). Let P = ∪Kk=1Pk. We assume that each commodity k ∈ JKK needs
to transfer a flow equal to (F θk )θ∈Θ ∈ R
|Θ|
≥0 .
We use the notation fθp ∈ R≥0 to denote the flow of players of type θ ∈ Θ that use a given path
p ∈ P . We use the notation f = (fθp )p∈P,θ∈Θ ∈ R
|P|·|Θ| to denote the aggregate vector of flows6. A
flow vector f ∈ R|P|·|Θ| is feasible if
∑
p∈Pk
fθp = F
θ
k for all k ∈ JKK and θ ∈ Θ. We use the notation
F to denote the set of all feasible flows. To ensure that the set of feasible flows is not an empty
set, we assume that Pk 6= ∅ if F θk 6= 0 for any θ ∈ Θ. Notice that the constraints associated with
each type are independent of the rest. Therefore, the flows of a specific type can be changed without
breaking the feasibility of the flows associated with the rest of the types.
A vehicle of type θ ∈ Θ that travels along an edge e ∈ E experiences a cost equal to ℓ˜θe((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ),
where for any θ ∈ Θ, φθe denotes the total flow of drivers of type θ that are using this specific edge, i.e.,
φθe =
∑
p∈P:e∈p f
θ
p . This cost can encompass aggregates of the latency, fuel consumption, etc. For
notational convenience, we assume that we can change the order with which the edge flows φθ
′
e appear
as arguments of the cost function ℓ˜θe((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ). A driver of type θ ∈ Θ from commodity k ∈ JKK
that uses path p ∈ Pk (connecting sk to tk) experiences a total cost of ℓθp(f) =
∑
e∈p ℓ˜
θ
e((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ).
Each player is an infinitesimal part of the flow that tries to minimize its own cost (i.e., each player
is inclined to choose the path that has the least cost). Now, based on this model, we can define the
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 (Nash Equilibrium in Heterogeneous Routing Games) A flow vector f =
(fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ is a Nash equilibrium if for all k ∈ JKK and θ ∈ Θ, f
θ
p > 0 for a path p ∈ Pk implies
that ℓθp(f) ≤ ℓ
θ
p′(f) for all p
′ ∈ Pk.
6Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of P ×Θ and the set of integers {1, . . . , |P| ·
|Θ|}.
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This definition implies that for a commodity k ∈ JKK and type θ ∈ Θ, all paths with a nonzero
flow for vehicles of type θ have equal costs and the rest (i.e., paths with a zero flow for vehicles of
type θ) have larger or equal costs.
Remark 2.1 Note that various articles use different names for the equilibrium such as, user-optim-
izing flow [9, 28], Wardrop equilibrium [4, 28, 49], Wardrop first principle [4], and Nash equilib-
rium [15, 16]. The term Wardrop equilibrium is common, specially in transportation literature, due
to the pioneering work of [3] as well as the fact that the term pure strategy Nash equilibrium is
primarily utilized in the context of games with finitely many players [49]. It is vital to note that the
definition of Nash equilibrium in this paper is indeed different from that of [49], which shows that by
increasing the number of users (in a game with finitely many players), the Nash equilibrium converges
to the Wardrop equilibrium under appropriate assumptions. Throughout this article, following the
convention of [15,16], we use the term Nash equilibrium to refer to this equilibrium.
We make the following standing assumption regarding the edge latency functions for all the types.
Assumption 2.1 For all θ ∈ Θ and e ∈ E, the edge cost function ℓ˜θe satisfies the following properties:
(i) ℓ˜θe ∈ C
1;
(ii) ℓ˜θe is positive definite;
(iii)
∫ φθe
0
ℓ˜θe(u, (φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ\{θ})du is a convex function in φ
θ
e for any given (φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ\{θ}.
Assumption 2.1 (iii) is equivalent to7:
(iii)’ ℓ˜θe(φ
θ
e , (φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ\{θ}) is an increasing function of φ
θ
e for any given (φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ\{θ}.
We start by proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium and, then, study the computational complex-
ity of finding such an equilibrium. However, before that, we present an example of a heterogeneous
routing game in the next subsection.
2.3 Example: Routing Game with Platooning Incentives
Let Θ = {c, t}, where t denotes trucks (or, equivalently, heavy-duty vehicles) and c denotes cars (or,
equivalently, light vehicles). Let the edge cost functions be characterized as
ℓ˜ce(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) = ξe(φ
c
e + φ
t
e),
ℓ˜te(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) = ξe(φ
c
e + φ
t
e) + ζe(φ
c
e, φ
t
e),
where mappings ξe : R≥0 → R≥0 and ζe : R≥0×R≥0 → R≥0 denote respectively the latency for using
edge e as a function of the total flow of vehicles over that edge and the fuel consumption of trucks as
a function of the flow of each type. These costs imply that cars only observe the latency ξe(φ
c
e + φ
t
e)
when using the roads (which is only a function of the total flow over that edge and not the individual
flows of each type). However, the cost associated with trucks encompasses an additional term which
models their fuel consumption. Following this interpretation, ζe(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) is a decreasing function in
φte since by having a higher flow of trucks over a given road (i.e., larger φ
t
e) each truck gets a higher
probability for collaboration such as platooning (and as a result, a higher chance of decreasing its
fuel consumption).
Let us give examples of these functions. Based on the traffic data measurements available from [3,
p. 366] (see [10] for a case study on the relationship between the average velocity and the number of
the vehicles on the road in Stockholm), we know that whenever the traffic on a road is in free-flow
mode, we can model the average velocity of traveling along that road as an affine function of the
flow of vehicles over that edge according to
v¯e(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) = ae(φ
c
e + φ
t
e) + be.
7Consult [18] for the proof of the equivalence when |Θ| = 1. The proof in the heterogeneous case follows the same
line of reasoning.
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In this model, be ∈ R≥0 and ae ∈ R≤0 for e ∈ E . Therefore, if the length of edge e ∈ E is equal to
Le ∈ R≥0, we can calculate the latency of using that edge as
ξe(φ
c
e + φ
t
e) =
Le
v¯e(φce, φ
t
e)
=
Le
ae(φce + φ
t
e) + be
.
Now, in cases where ae(φ
c
e + φ
t
e)≪ be, we can use a linearized
8 model for the latency
ξe(φ
c
e + φ
t
e) =
Le
be
−
Leae
b2e
(φce + φ
t
e).
In addition, using [53], we know that the total fuel consumption of a truck which is traveling with
velocity v¯e for distance Le over a flat road can be modeled by
ζe(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) =
c0Le
η¯engρd
(
1
2
ρaAacDv¯
2
e(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) +mgcr
)
, (1)
where η¯eng is the engine efficiency, ρd is the energy density of diesel fuel, cD is the air drag coefficient,
Aa is the frontal area of the truck, ρa is the air density, m is the mass of the truck, g is the
gravitational acceleration, and cr is the the roll resistance coefficient. In addition, we have multiplied
the fuel consumption by c0 to balance the trade-off between the latency and fuel consumption in
the aggregate cost function of the trucks. Following [11], we know that the air drag coefficient cD
decreases if the trucks are platooning (e.g., two identical trucks can achieve 4.7%–7.7% reduction in
the fuel consumption caused by the air drag reduction when platooning at 70 km/h depending on
the distance between them). Let us model these changes as cD = c
′
Dγ(φ
t
e) where γ : R≥0 → [0, 1] is
the probability of forming platoons (which is a function of the flow of trucks φte) multiplied by the
improvements in the air drag coefficient upon platooning. Let us define parameters
α =
LeρaAac
′
D
2η¯engρd
, β =
Lemgcr
η¯engρd
.
Now, again if we linearize (1) around φte = 0, we get
ζe(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) =
(
c0α
d
du
γ(u)|u=0b
2
e + 2c0αγ(0)beae
)
φte + (2c0αγ(0)beae)φ
c
e +
(
c0β + c0αγ(0)b
2
e
)
.
Combing all these terms results in
ℓ˜ce(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) =
Le
be
+
(
−
Leae
b2e
)
φce +
(
−
Leae
b2e
)
φte,
ℓ˜te(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) =
Le
be
+ c0β + c0αγ(0)b
2
e +
(
−
Leae
b2e
+ 2c0αγ(0)beae
)
φce
+
(
−
Leae
b2e
+ c0α
dγ(0)
du
b2e+2c0αγ(0)beae
)
φte.
Notice that Assumption 2.1 (i) and (ii) are easily satisfied. However, Assumption 2.1 (iii) is only
satisfied if
−
Leae
b2e
+ c0α
dγ(0)
du
b2e + 2c0αγ(0)beae ≥ 0.
This is indeed true because of the observation that Assumption 2.1 (iii) and (iii)’ are equivalent.
3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we show that the heterogeneous routing game admits a Nash equilibrium. Before
stating the result, we need to introduce some concepts from [37] which uses results of [38] to prove that
an abstract economy (an extension of a game) admits an equilibrium under appropriate conditions9.
8Notice that such a linearization is certainly not valid for a wide range of traffic flows, however, it models the
latency functions well-enough for small flows. The authors in [50, 51] proposed a piecewise linear mapping (based on
numerical data from the Toronto metropolitan area) for modeling the latency as a function of the flow of vehicles.
This model justifies using a linear model for small flows (i.e., at the beginning what they call the feasible region),
however, it also points out that a linear approximation is not valid for large flows. For a comprehensive comparison
of different latency mappings (linear as well as nonlinear ones), see [52].
9Note that we could alternatively follow the definition and results of [38] in a direct manner, however, in that case,
we need more background material presented which might be distracting to the audience.
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3.1 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games
Let us define an abstract economy10 as follows. Let Xi ⊆ R
n (for some n ∈ N) denote the action set
of player i ∈ JNK in an abstract economy with N players. We use the notation xi ∈ Xi to denote
the action of player i. In contrast to a game, the feasible set of actions that player i can choose
from is a function of actions of other players x−i = (xj)j 6=i. Let Zi : ×j 6=iXj ⇒ Xi be a set-valued
mapping that determines the set of feasible actions for player i. The utility of player i is governed
by a real-valued function Ui : ×Nj=1Xj → R. In this setup (opposed to the one presented in [37]), we
assume the players are seeking to minimize their utility.
Definition 3.1 (Equilibrium of an Abstract Economy [37]) x∗ is an equilibrium point of an
abstract economy if, for all i ∈ JNK, x∗i ∈ argminxi∈Zi(x∗−i) Ui(xi, x
∗
−i).
For any i ∈ JNK, we say that Zi has a closed graph at x−i ∈ ×j 6=iXj if the set {(xj)j∈JNK|xi ∈
Zi(x−i)} is a closed set. Now, we can state the result of [37] regarding the existence of such an
equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2 ([37]) If, for each i ∈ JNK, Xi is a compact convex set, Ui(xi, x−i) is continuous on
×Nj=1Xj and quasi-convex in xi for each x−i ∈ ×j 6=iXj, Zi is a continuous set-valued mapping that
has a closed graph, and Zi(x−i) is a nonempty convex set for each x−i ∈ ×j 6=iXj, then the abstract
economy admits an equilibrium.
Note that when Zi(x−i) = Xi for all x−i ∈ ×j 6=iXj , and all i, we have a game with finitely many
players. Therefore, an abstract economy can be considered as a generalization of a game.
Definition 3.3 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Games with Finitely Many Play-
ers [54]) x∗ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if, for all i ∈ JNK, x∗i ∈ argminxi∈Xi Ui(xi, x
∗
−i).
Theorem 3.2 results now in the following useful corollary.
Corollary 3.4 If, for each i ∈ JNK, Xi is a compact convex set and Ui(xi, x−i) is continuous on
×Nj=1Xj and quasi-convex in xi for each x−i ∈ ×j 6=iXj, then the game admits a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: The proof follows from utilizing Theorem 3.2 when, for all i ∈ JNK, Zi(x−i) = Xi for all
x−i ∈ ×j 6=iXj .

With this result in hand, we can go ahead and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in
the heterogeneous routing game. In the next subsection, we first prove that the problem of finding
a Nash equilibrium for the heterogeneous routing game is equivalent to the problem of finding a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in an abstract game11 with finitely many players. Then, we use
Corollary 3.4 to show that this game admits a Nash equilibrium under Assumption 2.1.
3.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Heterogeneous Routing Games
For the sake of simplicity of presentation and without loss of generality (since Θ is finite), we can
assume that Θ = {θ1, . . . , θN} where N = |Θ|. Now, let us define the abstract game.
Definition 3.5 An abstract game is a game with N players in which player i ∈ JNK corresponds
to type θi ∈ Θ in the heterogeneous routing game. The action of player i is ai = (f
θi
p′ )p′∈P which
belongs to the action set
Ai =
{
(fθip′ )p′∈P ∈ R
|P|
∣∣∣ ∑
p′∈Pk
fθip′ = F
θi
k
}
.
10An abstract economy was originally defined in [37]. It is an extension of a game.
11 We use the term “abstract” to emphasize the fact that the introduced game does not have any physical intuition
and it is simply a mathematical concept defined for proving the results of this paper. This expression should not be
confused with that of an “abstract economy”.
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Additionally, the utility of player i is defined as
Ui(ai, a−i) =
∑
e∈E
∫ φθie
0
ℓ˜θie (u, (φ
θj
e )θj∈Θ\{θi})du, (2)
where a−i represents the actions of the rest of the players (aj)j∈JNK\{i} and φ
θi
e =
∑
p∈P:e∈p f
θi
p is
the edge flow of type θi for each i ∈ JNK.
The following result establishes an interesting relationship between the introduced abstract game
and the underlying heterogeneous routing game.
Lemma 3.6 A flow vector (fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ is a Nash equilibrium of the heterogeneous routing game if
and only if ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , . . . , (f
θN
p′ )p′∈P) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the abstract game.
Proof: Notice that ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , . . . , (f
θN
p′ )p′∈P) being a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (see Defini-
tion 3.3) of the abstract game is equivalent to that for all i ∈ JNK, ai = (f
θi
p′ )p′∈P is the best response
of player i to the tuple of actions a−i = ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi} or, equivalently,
ai ∈ argmin
(f
θi
p′
)p′∈P
∑
e∈E
∫ φθie
0
ℓ˜θie (u, (φ
θj
e )θj∈Θ\{θi})du,
s.t.
∑
p∈P:e∈p
fθip = φ
θi
e , ∀e ∈ E ,
∑
p∈Pk
fθip = F
θi
k , ∀k ∈ JKK,
fθip ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P .
where φ
θj
e =
∑
p∈P:e∈p f
θj
p for all j ∈ JNK\{i}. Notice that due to Assumption 2.1 (iii), this problem
is indeed a convex optimization problem. Let us define the Lagrangian as
Li((φ
θi
e′ )e′∈E , (f
θi
p′ )p′∈P)=
∑
e∈E
∫ φθie
0
ℓ˜θie (u, (φ
θj
e )θj∈Θ\{θi})du+
∑
e∈E
vie

 ∑
p∈P:e∈p
fθip − φ
θi
e


−
K∑
k=1
wik

∑
p∈Pk
fθip − F
θi
k

−∑
p∈P
λipf
θi
p ,
where (vie)e∈E ∈ R
|E|, (wik)k∈JKK ∈ R
K , and (λip)p∈P ∈ R
|P|
≥0 are Lagrange multipliers. Now, using
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker theorem [55, p. 244], optimality conditions are
∂
∂φθie
Li((φ
θi
e′ )e′∈E , (f
θi
p′ )p′∈P) = ℓ˜
θi
e (φ
θi
e , (φ
θj
e )θj∈Θ\{θi})− v
i
e = 0, ∀e ∈ E , (3)
and
∂
∂fθip
Li((φ
θi
e′ )e′∈E , (f
θi
p′ )p′∈P) =
(∑
e∈p
vie
)
− wik − λ
i
p = 0, ∀p ∈ Pk, ∀k ∈ JKK. (4)
Additionally, the complimentary slackness conditions (for inequality constraints) result in λipf
i
p = 0
for all p ∈ P . Hence, for all k and p ∈ Pk, we have
ℓθip ((f
θ′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ) =
∑
e∈p
ℓ˜θie (φ
θi
e , (φ
θj
e )θj∈Θ\{θi})
=
∑
e∈p
vie by (3)
= wik + λ
i
p. by (4)
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Therefore, for any p1, p2 ∈ Pk, if fθip1 , f
θi
p2
> 0, we have λθip1 = λ
θi
p2
= 0 (because of the complimentary
slackness conditions), which results in
ℓθip1((f
θ′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ) = w
i
k
= ℓθip2((f
θ′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ).
Furthermore, for any p3 ∈ Pk such that f
θi
p3
= 0, we get λθip3 ≥ 0 (because of dual feasibility, i.e., the
Lagrange multipliers associated with inequality constraints must be non-negative), which results in
ℓθip3((f
θ′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ) = w
i
k + λ
θi
p3
≥ wik
= ℓθip1((f
θ′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ).
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.7 Under Assumption 2.1, the heterogeneous routing game admits at least one Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Following the result of Lemma 3.6, proving the statement of this theorem is equivalent
to showing the fact that the abstract game introduced in Definition 3.5 admits at least one pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. First, notice that for all i ∈ JNK, Ai is a non-empty, convex, and
compact subset of the Euclidean space R|P|. Second, Ui(ai, a−i) is continuous in all its arguments
(because it is defined as an integral of a real-valued measurable function). Finally, because of
Assumption 2.1 (iii), Ui(ai, a−i) is a convex function in ai. Now, it follows from Corollary 3.4 that
the abstract game admits at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Remark 3.1 Theorem 3.7 can be seen as an extension of [28]. In that study, the authors assume
that the cost functions are monotone, that is, ℓ˜θe((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ) ≤ ℓ˜
θ
e((φ¯
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ) for all θ ∈ Θ if φ
θ′
e ≤ φ¯
θ′
e
if θ′ ∈ Θ; see [28, p. 58]. This condition, in turn, implies that ℓ˜θe((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ) is a non-decreasing
function of all its arguments which is stronger than Assumption 2.1 (iii)’.
4 Finding a Nash Equilibrium
A family of games that are relatively easy to analyze are potential games. In this section, we give
conditions for when the introduced abstract game is a potential game.
Definition 4.1 (Potential Game [23]) The abstract game is a potential game with potential
function V : ×Ni=1Ai → R if for all i ∈ JNK,
V (ai, a−i)− V (a¯i, a−i) = Ui(ai, a−i)− Ui(a¯i, a−i),
∀ai, a¯i ∈ Ai and a−i ∈ ×j∈JNK\{i}Aj .
The next lemma provides a necessary condition for the existence of a potential function in C2.
Lemma 4.2 If the abstract game admits a potential function V ∈ C2, then
∑
e∈p1∩p2
[
∂
∂φθie
ℓ˜θje ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ)−
∂
∂φ
θj
e
ℓ˜θie ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ)
]
= 0,
for all i, j ∈ JNK and p1, p2 ∈ P.
Proof: Since V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , . . . , (f
θN
p′ )p′∈P) is a potential function for the abstract game, it satisfies,
for all i ∈ JNK,
V ((fθip′ )p′∈P , ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi})− V ((f¯
θi
p′ )p′∈P , ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi})
= Ui((f
θi
p′ )p′∈P , ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi})− Ui((f¯
θi
p′ )p′∈P , ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi}),
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which results in the identity
∂V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂fθip1
= lim
ǫ→0
V ((fθip′ + ǫδp1p′)p′∈P , ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi})−V ((f
θi
p′ )p′∈P , ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi})
ǫ
= lim
ǫ→0
Ui((f
θi
p′ + ǫδp1p′)p′∈P , ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi})−Ui((f
θi
p′ )p′∈P , ((f
θj
p′ )p′∈P)θj∈Θ\{θi})
ǫ
=
∂Ui((f
θ′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂fθip1
.
(5)
in which δij denotes the Kronecker index (or delta) defined as δij = 1 if i = j and δij = 0 otherwise.
Hence, we get
∂V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂fθip1
=
∂
∂fθip1
∑
e∈E
∫ φθie
0
ℓ˜θie (u,(φ
θj
e )θj∈Θ\{θi})du
=
∑
e∈p1
ℓ˜θie ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ).
Now, because of Clairaut-Schwarz theorem [56, p. 1067], we know that the following equality must
hold since V ∈ C2,
∂2V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂fθip1∂f
θj
p2
=
∂2V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂f
θj
p2∂f
θi
p1
. (6)
Let us calculate
∂2V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂fθip1∂f
θj
p2
=
∂
∂fθip1
[
∂V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂f
θj
p2
]
=
∂
∂fθip1
[∑
e∈p2
ℓ˜θje ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ)
]
=
∑
e∈p1∩p2
∂ℓ˜
θj
e ((φθ
′
e )θ′∈Θ)
∂φθie
,
(7)
and, similarly,
∂2V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂f
θj
p2∂f
θi
p1
=
∑
e∈p1∩p2
∂ℓ˜θie ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ)
∂φ
θj
e
. (8)
Substituting (6) and (7) into (8) results in
∑
e∈p1∩p2
[
∂
∂φ
θj
e
ℓ˜θie ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ)−
∂
∂φθie
ℓ˜θje ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ)
]
= 0,
for all p1, p2 ∈ P and θi, θj ∈ Θ. 
Interestingly, we can prove that this condition is also a sufficient condition for the existence of
a potential function (that belongs to C2) whenever two types of players are participating in the
heterogeneous routing game.
Lemma 4.3 Assume that |Θ| = 2. If∑
e∈p1∩p2
[
∂
∂φθ1e
ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )−
∂
∂φθ2e
ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
]
= 0,
for all p1, p2 ∈ P, then
V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)=
∑
e∈E
[∫ φθ1e
0
ℓ˜θ1e (u1, φ
θ2
e )du1+
∫ φθ2e
0
ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , u2)du2
−
∫ φθ2e
0
∫ φθ1e
0
∂
∂u2
ℓ˜θ1e (u1, u2)du1du2
]
10
is a potential function for the abstract game.
Proof: Notice that for all p ∈ P , we get
∂V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂f
θ1
p
=
∂
∂f
θ1
p
(∑
e∈E
[ ∫ φθ1e
0
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e )du1+
∫ φθ2e
0
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)du2−
∫ φθ2e
0
∫ φθ1e
0
∂
∂u2
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, u2)du1du2
])
=
∑
e∈p
[
ℓ˜
θ1
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) +
∫ φθ2e
0
∂
∂φ
θ1
e
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)du2 −
∫ φθ2e
0
∂
∂u2
ℓ˜
θ1
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)du2
]
=
∑
e∈p
ℓ˜
θ1
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) +
∑
e∈p
∫ φθ2e
0
[
∂
∂φ
θ1
e
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)−
∂
∂u2
ℓ˜
θ1
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)
]
du2.
(9)
Now, let us define
Ψ((φθ1e )e∈E , (φ
θ2
e )e∈E ) =
∑
e∈p
∫ φθ2e
0
[
∂
∂φθ1e
ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , u)−
∂
∂u
ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , u)
]
du.
We have
∂Ψ((φθ1e )e∈E , (φ
θ2
e )e∈E )
∂fθ2pˆ
=
∑
e∈p∩pˆ
[
∂
∂φθ1e
ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )−
∂
∂u
ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
]
=0,
for all pˆ ∈ P . Noticing that φθ2e =
∑
pˆ∈P:e∈pˆ f
θ2
pˆ for all e ∈ E , we get
∂Ψ((φθ1e )e∈E , (φ
θ2
e )e∈E)
∂φθ2e
=
∑
pˆ∈P:e∈pˆ
∂Ψ((φθ1e )e∈E , (φ
θ2
e )e∈E)
∂fθ2pˆ
= 0, ∀e ∈ E .
Thus, Ψ((φθ1e )e∈E , (φ
θ2
e )e∈E ) = Ψ((φ
θ1
e )e∈E , 0) = 0. Setting Ψ((φ
θ1
e )e∈E , (φ
θ2
e )e∈E ) = 0 (see definition
above) inside (9) results in
∂V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂fθ1p
=
∑
e∈p
ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) =
∂U1((f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)
∂fθ1p
, (10)
where the partial derivatives of U1 can be computed from its definition in (2). Let (f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P and
(f¯θ1p′ )p′∈P be arbitrary points in set of actions A1. Furthermore, let r : [0, 1]→ A1 be a continuously
differentiable mapping (i.e., r ∈ C1) such that r(0) = (f¯θ1p′ )p′∈P and r(1) = (f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P which remains
inside A1 ⊆ R|P| for all t ∈ (0, 1). We define graph(r) as the collection of all ordered pairs (t, r(t))
for all t ∈ [0, 1], which denotes a continuous path that connects (fθ1p′ )p′∈P and (f¯
θ1
p′ )p′∈P . We know
that at least one such mapping exists because A1 is a simply connected set for all i ∈ JNK. Hence,
we have
∫
graph(r)
[
∂V (a1, a2)
∂a1
∣∣∣∣
a1=r
]⊤
dr =
∫ 1
0
[
∂V (a1, a2)
∂a1
∣∣∣∣
a1=r(t)
]⊤
∂r(t)
∂t
dt
=
∫ 1
0
[
d
dt
V (r(t), a2)
]
dt
= V (r(1), a2)− V (r(0), a2)
= V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)− V ((f¯
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P),
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where the second to last equality is a direct consequence of the fundamental theorem of calculus [56,
p. 1257]. Note that this equality holds irrespective of the selected path. Therefore,
V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)− V ((f¯
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)
=
∫
graph(r)
[
∂V (a1, a2)
∂a1
∣∣∣∣
a1=r
]⊤
dr
=
∫
graph(r)
[
∂U1(a1, a2)
∂a1
∣∣∣∣
a1=r
]⊤
dr by (10)
= U1((f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)− U1((f¯
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P),
Similarly, we can also prove
∂V ((fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ)
∂f
θ2
p
=
∂
∂f
θ2
p
(∑
e∈E
[ ∫ φθ1e
0
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e )du1+
∫ φθ2e
0
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)du2−
∫ φθ2e
0
∫ φθ1e
0
∂
∂u2
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, u2)du1du2
])
=
∑
e∈p
[ ∫ φθ1e
0
∂
∂φ
θ2
e
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e )du1 + ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )−
∫ φθ1e
0
∂
∂φ
θ2
e
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e )du1
]
=
∑
e∈p
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ),
(11)
which results in
∂V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)
∂fθ2p
=
∑
e∈p
ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )=
∂U2((f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)
∂fθ2p
,
and, consequently,
V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)− V ((f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f¯
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)
= U2((f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P)− U2((f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f¯
θ2
p′ )p′∈P).
This concludes the proof. 
Now, combing the previous two lemmas results in the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.4 Assume that |Θ| = 2. The abstract game admits a potential function V ∈ C2 if and
only if ∑
e∈p1∩p2
[
∂
∂φθ1e
ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )−
∂
∂φθ2e
ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
]
= 0,
for all p1, p2 ∈ P.
Proof: The proof easily follows from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. Note that the potential function presented
in Lemma 4.3 belongs to C2 due to Assumption 2.1 (i). 
Following a basic property of potential games, it is easy to prove the following corollary which
shows that the process of finding a Nash equilibrium of the heterogeneous routing game is equivalent
to solving an optimization problem.
Corollary 4.5 Assume that |Θ| = 2. Furthermore, let
∑
e∈p
[
∂
∂φθ1e
ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )−
∂
∂φθ2e
ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
]
= 0,
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for all p ∈ P. If f = (fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ is a solution of the optimization problem
min V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P),
s.t.
∑
p∈P:e∈p
fθ1p = φ
θ1
e and
∑
p∈P:e∈p
fθ2p = φ
θ2
e , ∀e ∈ E ,
∑
p∈Pk
fθ1p = F
θ1
k and
∑
p∈Pk
fθ2p = F
θ2
k , ∀k ∈ JKK,
fθ1p , f
θ2
p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P ,
where V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P) is defined in Lemma 4.3, then f = (f
θ
p )p∈P,θ∈Θ is a Nash equilibrium
of the heterogeneous routing game.
Proof: The proof is consequence of the fact that a minimizer of the potential function is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of a potential game; see [23]. 
Notice that so far we have proved that a minimizer of the potential function is a Nash equilibrium
but not the other way round. Now, we are ready to prove this whenever the potential function is
convex.
Corollary 4.6 Let |Θ| = 2 and
∂
∂φθ1e
ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) =
∂
∂φθ2e
ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ),
for all e ∈ E. Furthermore, assume that the potential function V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P), defined in
Lemma 4.3, is a convex function. Then f = (fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ is a Nash equilibrium of the heterogeneous
routing game if and only if it is a solution of the convex optimization problem
min V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P),
s.t.
∑
p∈P:e∈p
fθ1p = φ
θ1
e and
∑
p∈P:e∈p
fθ2p = φ
θ2
e , ∀e ∈ E ,
∑
p∈Pk
fθ1p = F
θ1
k and
∑
p∈Pk
fθ2p = F
θ2
k , ∀k ∈ JKK,
fθ1p , f
θ2
p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P .
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Remark 4.1 Note that Corollary 4.6 is proved at the price of a more conservative condition because
the conditions in Corollary 4.5 requires the summation of the differences between the derivatives of
the cost functions to be equal to zero while Corollary 4.6 needs the individual differences to be equal
to zero. Notice that Corollary 4.6 provides the same sufficient condition for characterizing the set
of all equilibria as in [9, 25], but these references handle the general case of |Θ| ≥ 2 (specifically,
see Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 in [25]). Therefore, we can see that the presented condition in
Corollary 4.5 is tighter than the results of [9,25] (since it is also a necessary condition); however, it
is only valid for |Θ| = 2 in contrast.
4.1 Example: Routing Game with Platooning Incentives
Let us examine the implications of Corollary 4.6 in the routing game with platooning incentives in
Subsection 2.3. For the linearized model, we can easily calculate that
∂ℓ˜ce(φ
c
e, φ
t
e)
∂φte
= −Leae/b
2
e, (12)
∂ℓ˜te(φ
c
e, φ
t
e)
∂φce
= −Leae/b
2
e + 2c0αγ(0)beae
= −Leae/b
2
e + 2c0αbeae.
(13)
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where the second equality follows from γe(0) = 1, which holds because from the definition of the
mapping γ : R≥0 → [0, 1], we know that in this case (i.e., when no trucks are using that edge) the
air drag coefficient is equal to its nominal value. Therefore, the condition of Corollary 4.6 does not
hold (unless c0 = 0). Noting that if the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in the heterogeneous
routing game is numerically intractable, it might be highly unlikely for the drivers to figure out a
Nash equilibrium in reasonable time (let alone an efficient one) and utilize it, which might result in
wasting parts of the transportation network resources. Therefore, a natural question that comes to
mind is whether it is possible to guarantee the existence of a potential function for a heterogeneous
routing game by imposing appropriate tolls.
5 Imposing Tolls to Guarantee the Existence of a Potential
Function
5.1 Definition and Results
Let us assume that a vehicle of type θ ∈ Θ must pay a toll τ˜θe ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ) for using an edge e ∈ E ,
where φθe =
∑
p∈P:e∈p f
θ
p . Therefore, a vehicle using path p ∈ Pk endures a total cost of ℓ
θ
p(f)+τ
θ
p (f),
where τp(f) is the total amount of money that the vehicle must pay for using path p and can be
calculated as τθp (f) =
∑
e∈p τ˜
θ
e ((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ). The definition of a Nash equilibrium is slightly modified
to account for the tolls.
Definition 5.1 (Nash Equilibrium in Heterogeneous Routing Game with Tolls) A flow
vector f = (fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ is a Nash equilibrium for the routing game with tolls if, for all k ∈ JKK and
θ ∈ Θ, whenever fθp > 0 for some path p ∈ Pk, then ℓ
θ
p(f) + τ
θ
p (f) ≤ ℓ
θ
p′(f) + τ
θ
p′(f) for all p
′ ∈ Pk.
Before stating the main result of this section, note that we can have both distinguishable and indis-
tinguishable types. This characterization is of special interest when considering the implementation
of tolls. For distinguishable types, we can impose individual tolls for each type. However, for indistin-
guishable types, the tolls are independent of the type. To give an example, if Θ = {cars, trucks}, we
can impose different tolls for each group of vehicles while if Θ = {patient drivers, impatient drivers},
we cannot. Notice that in the case of indistinguishable types, one might argue that we cannot mea-
sure φθie for each θi ∈ Θ individually (because as we motivated the type of user may not be identified
from physical traits). However, we can use surveys and historical data to extract the statistics of
each type (e.g, to realize what ratio of the actual flow belongs to each type) but when calculating
the tolls for each user we cannot force that user to participate in a survey. We treat these two cases
separately.
Proposition 5.2 (Distinguishable Types) Assume that |Θ| = 2. The abstract game admits the
potential function
V ((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P) =
∑
e∈E
[ ∫ φθ1e
0
(ℓ˜θ1e (u1, φ
θ2
e ) + τ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e ))du1
+
∫ φθ2e
0
(ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , u2) + τ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2))du2
−
∫ φθ2e
0
∫ φθ1e
0
∂
∂u2
(ℓ˜θ1e (u1, u2) + τ˜
θ1
e (u1, u2))du1du2
]
if
∂τ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ2e
−
∂τ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ1e
=
∂ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ1e
−
∂ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ2e
,
for all e ∈ E.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
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Proposition 5.3 (Indistinguishable Types) Assume that |Θ| = 2. The abstract game admits
the potential function V ∈ C2 in Proposition 5.2 with τ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) = τ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) = τ˜e(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) if
∂τ˜e(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ2e
−
∂τ˜e(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ1e
=
∂ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ1e
−
∂ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ2e
,
for all e ∈ E.
Proof: The proof immediately follows from using Proposition 5.2 with the constraint that the tolls
may not depend on the type, i.e., τ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) = τ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) = τ˜e(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ). 
In general, we can prove the following corollary concerning the type-independent tolls.
Corollary 5.4 ( Indistingushable Types) Assume that |Θ| = 2. The abstract game admits a
potential function V ∈ C2 if the imposed tolls are of the following form
τ˜e(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) = ce +
∫ φθ2e
0
fe(q, φ
θ1
e + φ
θ2
e − q)dq + ψe(φ
θ1
e + φ
θ2
e ),
where ce ∈ R≥0, ψe ∈ C1, and fe(x, y) = ∂ℓ˜θ2e (y, x)/∂y − ∂ℓ˜
θ1
e (y, x)/∂x for all e ∈ E.
Proof: See Appendix C. 
Throughout this subsection, we assumed that all the drivers portray similar sensitivity to the
imposed tolls. This is indeed a source of conservatism, specially when dealing with routing games in
which the heterogeneity is caused by the fact that the drivers react differently to the imposed tolls.
Certainly, an avenue for future research is to develop tolls for a more general setup.
5.2 Example: Routing Game with Platooning Incentives
Let us examine the possibility of finding a set of tolls that satisfies the conditions of Propositions 5.2
and 5.3 for the heterogeneous routing game introduced in Subsection 2.3.
• Distinguishable Types-Case 1: Substituting (12) and (13) into the condition of Proposi-
tion 5.2 results in
∂τ˜ce (φ
c
e, φ
t
e)
∂φte
−
∂τ˜ te(φ
c
e, φ
t
e)
∂φce
= 2c0αbeae. (14)
Following simple algebraic calculations, we can check that the tolls τ˜ce (φ
c
e, φ
t
e) = 0 and τ˜
t
e(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) =
(2c0αbeae)φ
c
e satisfy (14). Noticing that τ˜
t
e(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) ≤ 0 because by definition ae ∈ R≤0, these
terms can be interpreted as subsidies paid to the trucks to compensate for the fuel that is
wasted due to presence of the cars on that specific edge.
• Distinguishable Types-Case 2: Another example of appropriate tolls is τ˜ te(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) = 0 and
τ˜ce (φ
c
e, φ
t
e) = (−2c0αbeae)φ
t
e. Now, we have τ˜
c
e (φ
c
e, φ
t
e) ≥ 0. In this case, the cars pay directly
for the increased fuel consumption of the trucks and, therefore, they are inclined to travel along
the edges that trucks do not use.
• Indistinguishable Types: For this case, using Corollary 5.4, it is easy to see that tolls
τ˜e(φ
c
e, φ
t
e) = (2c0αbeae)φ
t
e work fine. We use these tolls in the numerical example developed in
Section 7.
6 Price of Anarchy for Affine Cost Functions
In the routing game literature, it is a widely known fact that generally, a Nash equilibrium is inefficient
even when dealing with homogeneous routing games; see [15, 18, 22]. To quantify this inefficiency,
many studies have used Price of Anarchy (PoA) as a metric.
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6.1 Social Cost Function
First, let us define the social cost of a flow vector f = (fθ
′
p′ )p′∈P,θ′∈Θ as
C(f) ,
∑
p∈P
∑
θ∈Θ
fθp ℓ
θ
p(f)
=
∑
e∈E
∑
θ∈Θ
φθe ℓ˜
θ
e((φ
θ′
e )θ′∈Θ),
where the second equality can be easily obtained by rearranging the terms. Using this social cost,
we can define the optimal flow that we will use later for comparison with the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 6.1 (Socially Optimal Flow) f ∈ F is a socially optimal flow if C(f) ≤ C(f¯) for
all f¯ ∈ F .
Definition 6.2 (PoA) The price of anarchy is defined as
PoA = sup
fNash∈N
C(fNash)
minf∈F C(f)
,
where N denotes the set of Nash equilibria of the heterogeneous routing game. In this definition, we
follow the convention that “ 00 = 1”.
6.2 Bounding the Price of Anarchy for Two Types with Affine Cost Func-
tions
Here, we present an upper bound for the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium in heterogeneous routing
games when |Θ| = 2. The edge cost functions are taken to be affine functions of the form
ℓθ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) = α
e
θ1θ1
φθ1e + α
e
θ1θ2
φθ2e + β
e
θ1
,
ℓθ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) = α
e
θ2θ1
φθ1e + α
e
θ2θ2
φθ2e + β
e
θ2
,
where αeθ1θ1 , α
e
θ1θ2
, αeθ2θ1 , α
e
θ2θ2
, βeθ1 , β
e
θ2
∈ R≥0 are parameters of the routing game for each edge
e ∈ E . Notice that the condition αeθ1θ1 , α
e
θ1θ2
, αeθ2θ1 , α
e
θ2θ2
∈ R≥0 implies that the cost of using an
edge is increasing in each flow separately (i.e., when a driver of any type switches to an edge, she
cannot decrease the cost of the users on this new edge) while βeθ1 , β
e
θ2
∈ R≥0 implies that the starting
cost of using a road is non-negative. This assumption is certainly stronger than Assumption 2.1.
Subsection 2.3 presents a motivating example for affine cost functions.
Theorem 6.3 Let
αeθ2θ1 = α
e
θ1θ2
(15a)[
αeθ1θ1 α
e
θ1θ2
αeθ2θ1 α
e
θ2θ2
]
≥ 0, (15b)
for all e ∈ E. Then, PoA ≤ 2.
Proof: First, note that if αeθ2θ1 = α
e
θ1θ2
for all e ∈ E , the condition of Corollary 4.5 is satisfied.
Therefore, we can easily calculate the potential function as
V (f) =
∑
e∈E
[
1
2
α
e
θ1θ1
(φθ1e )
2+(αeθ1θ2φ
θ2
e +β
e
θ1
)φθ1e +
1
2
α
e
θ2θ2
(φθ2e )
2 + (αeθ2θ1φ
θ1
e + β
e
θ2
)φθ2e −α
e
θ1θ2
φ
θ1
e φ
θ2
e
]
=
∑
e∈E
[
1
2
φ
θ1
e ℓ
θ1
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) +
1
2
β
e
θ1
φ
θ1
e +
1
2
φ
θ2
e ℓ
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) +
1
2
β
e
θ2
φ
θ2
e
]
=
1
2
C(f) +
∑
e∈E
1
2
[
β
e
θ1
φ
θ1
e + β
e
θ2
φ
θ2
e
]
,
(16)
Furthermore, following the argument of [55, p. 71], we know that the social cost function is a convex
function if and only if (15b) is satisfied. Notice that (16) shows that the potential function V is
a convex function if the social cost function C is a convex function (because the summation of a
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Table 1: Parameters of the heterogeneous routing game in the numerical example.
e0 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 e10 e11
αaa 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 4.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 4.0 1.0
αat 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
αtt 2.0 3.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.5 3.0 1.7 3.0 1.0 1.3
βa 2.0 2.0 4.5 2.0 2.0 4.5 2.0 2.0 4.5 2.0 2.0 4.5
βt 4.0 4.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 1.5
convex function and a linear function is a convex function). Let us use f¯ and f to denote the Nash
equilibrium and the socially optimal flow, respectively. Now, we can prove inequality
C(f¯) ≤ 2V (f¯) by (16) and βeθ1 , β
e
θ2
∈ R≥0
≤ 2V (f) by Corollary 4.6
≤ 2
∑
e∈E
(∫ φθ1e
0
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e )du1 +
∫ φθ2e
0
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)du2
−
∫ φθ2e
0
∫ φθ1e
0
∂
∂u
ℓ˜
θ1
e (t, u)dtdu
)
by Definition of V
≤ 2
∑
e∈E
(∫ φθ1e
0
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e )du1 +
∫ φθ2e
0
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)du2
)
by αeθ1θ2 , α
e
θ2θ1
∈ R≥0
≤ 2
(∑
e∈E
∫ φθ1e
0
[
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e ) + u1
∂
∂u1
ℓ˜
θ1
e (u1, φ
θ2
e )
]
du1
+
∑
e∈E
∫ φθ2e
0
[
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2) + u2
∂
∂u2
ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , u2)
]
du2
)
by αeθ1θ1 , α
e
θ2θ2
∈ R≥0
≤ 2
(∑
e∈E
φ
θ1
e ℓ˜
θ1
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) +
∑
e∈E
φ
θ2
e ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
)
= 2C(f). (17)
This completes the proof. 
Notice that in many practical situations (such as the one presented in Subsection 4.1 for routing
games with platooning incentives), αeθ2θ1 6= α
e
θ1θ2
. Therefore, we may not be able to use Theorem 6.3
to find an upper bound for the PoA. However, as also discussed in Section 5, in some cases, we
might be able to manipulate these gains through appropriate tolls to make sure (15a) holds. In
addition, condition (15b) is equivalent to the condition that αeθ1θ1α
e
θ2θ2
≥ αeθ2θ1α
e
θ1θ2
for all e ∈ E .
This condition intuitively means that cost function of each type of vehicles is more influenced by
the flow of its own type than the flow of the other type. This condition may not hold in general in
transportation networks. In such case, instead of using Corollary 4.6, we may use Corollary 4.5 in
the proof of Theorem 6.3 (that is the only place that we use the convexity of the potential function
which we proved using the convexity of the social decision function). However, doing so, we cannot
bound the ratio C(fNash)/minf C(f) for all f
Nash ∈ N . Therefore, instead of showing that PoA is
bounded from above by two, we can then only show that the Price of Stability12 is upper bounded
by two (because we can show that the ratio is bounded by two for only one Nash equilibrium and
not for all Nash equilibria).
7 Numerical Example
In this section, we present a numerical example motivated by the routing game with platooning
incentives in Subsection 2.3. We use the graph G = (V , E) in Figure 1. We have three commodities
(s1, t1) = (0, 1), (s2, t2) = (2, 3), and (s3, t3) = (7, 8). The corresponding paths for the commodities
are
P1={{e1},{e2, e4, e3},{e2, e7, e5}},
P2={{e10},{e9, e7, e8},{e9, e4, e6}},
P3={{e11, e10, e0},{e11, e9, e7, e8, e0},{e11, e9, e4, e6, e0}}.
12 Price of Stability (PoS), or commonly known as the optimistic Price of Anarchy, is defined as
inffNash∈N C(f
Nash)/minf∈F C(f); note that we use inf operator instead of sup operator in this definition in contrast
to that of Definition 6.2. See [57] for more explanation regarding the difference between PoS and PoA.
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Figure 1: Transportation network in the numerical example.
The edge cost functions are taken to be affine functions of the form
ℓ˜cei(φ
c
ei
, φtei) = α
(i)
cc φ
c
ei
+ α¯
(i)
ct φ
t
ei
+ β(i)c ,
ℓ˜tei(φ
c
ei
, φtei) = α
(i)
tc φ
c
ei
+ α¯
(i)
tt φ
t
ei
+ β
(i)
t ,
where the definitions and the physical intuition of the parameters α
(i)
cc , α
(i)
tc , α¯
(i)
tt , α¯
(i)
ct , β
(i)
c , β
(i)
t can
be found in Subsection 2.3. Recalling that α¯
(i)
tc 6= α¯
(i)
ct (see Subsection 4.1), the condition of Corol-
lary 4.5 is not satisfied. Therefore, we use the tax τ˜ei(φ
c
ei
, φtei) = (2c0αbeae)φ
t
ei
which is developed
in Subsection 5.2. This results in
ℓ˜cei(φ
c
ei
, φtei) + τ˜ei(φ
c
ei
, φtei) = α
(i)
cc φ
c
ei
+ α
(i)
ct φ
t
ei
+ β(i)c ,
ℓ˜tei(φ
c
ei
, φtei) + τ˜ei(φ
c
ei
, φtei) = α
(i)
tc φ
c
ei
+ α
(i)
tt φ
t
ei
+ β
(i)
t ,
where α
(i)
ct = α¯
(i)
ct + 2c0αbeae and α
(i)
tt = α¯
(i)
tt +2c0αbeae. In this case, we can calculate the potential
function as
V =
11∑
i=0
[
1
2
α(i)cc (φ
c
ei
)2+(α
(i)
ct φ
t
ei
+β(i)c )φ
c
ei
− α
(i)
ct φ
c
ei
φtei +
1
2
α
(i)
tt (φ
t
ei
)2 + (α
(i)
tc φ
c
ei
+ β
(i)
t )φ
t
ei
]
.
Noticing that solving a non-convex quadratic programming problem might be numerically intractable
in general, we focus on the case in which the potential function is a convex function. Following the
argument of [55, p. 71], we know that the potential function is a convex function if and only if[
α
(i)
cc
1
2α
(i)
ct
1
2α
(i)
tc α
(i)
tt
]
≥ 0, ∀i = {0, . . . , 11}.
Let us pick the parameters for the routing game according to Table 1. Furthermore, we choose
(F a1 , F
b
1 ) = (5, 1), (F
a
2 , F
b
2 ) = (3, 3), and (F
a
3 , F
b
3 ) = (2, 4). After solving the optimization problem
in Corollary 4.5, we can extract the path flows and path cost functions shown in Table 2 which
demonstrate a Nash equilibrium (see Definition 5.1)13. In addition, we can calculate
C(f)
C(f∗)
= 1.0137 ≤ 2 = Upper Bound of the PoA,
where f∗ denotes the socially optimal flow. This shows that the social cost of the recovered Nash
equilibrium is only 1.0137 times the cost of the socially optimal solutions.
8 Conclusions
In this article, we proposed a heterogeneous routing game in which the players may belong to more
than one type. The type of each player determines the cost of using an edge as a function of the
flow of all types over that edge. We proved that this heterogeneous routing game admits at least
one Nash equilibrium. Additionally, we gave a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a potential function, which indeed implies that we can transform the problem of finding a Nash
equilibrium into an optimization problem. Finally, we developed tolls to guarantee the existence of a
potential function. Possible future research will focus on generalizing these results to higher number
of types or a continuum of player types.
13See http://dl.dropbox.com/u/36867745/HeterogeneousRoutingGame.zip for the Python code to simulate this
numerical example.
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Table 2: The path flow and path cost function at a Nash equilibrium extracted by minimizing the
potential function.
fcp f
t
p
p ∈ P1
4.97 0.79
0.00 0.00
0.03 0.21
p ∈ P2
1.04 0.06
0.04 0.00
1.92 2.94
p ∈ P3
0.01 0.00
1.10 0.00
0.88 4.00
ℓcp(f) ℓ
t
p(f)
p ∈ P1
12.26 8.35
13.18 10.29
12.26 8.35
p ∈ P2
13.92 11.22
13.92 13.98
13.92 11.22
p ∈ P3
28.02 31.73
28.02 34.48
28.02 31.72
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A Proof of Corollary 4.6
Let us define the Lagrangian as
L((fθ1p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P) =V ((f
θ1
p′ )p′∈P , (f
θ2
p′ )p′∈P) +
2∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
vie

 ∑
p∈P:e∈p
fθip − φ
θi
e


−
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
wik

∑
p∈Pk
fθip − F
θi
k

− 2∑
i=1
∑
p∈P
λipf
i
p,
where (v1e)e∈E ∈ R
|E|, (v2e)e∈E ∈ R
|E|, (w1k)k∈JKK ∈ R
K , (w2k)k∈JKK ∈ R
K , (λ1p)p∈P ∈ R
|P|
≥0 , and
(λ2p)p∈P ∈ R
|P|
≥0 are Lagrange multipliers. Using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions [55, p. 244], opti-
mality conditions are
∂L
∂φθ1e
= ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) +
∫ φθ2e
0
∂ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , u2)
∂φθ1e
du2 −
∫ φθ2e
0
∂
∂u
ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , u)du− v
1
e
= ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )− v
1
e +
∫ φθ2e
0
(
∂ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , u)
∂φθ1e
−
∂ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , u)
∂u
)
du
= ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )− v
1
e = 0, ∀e ∈ E ,
(18a)
∂L
∂φθ2e
=
∫ φθ1e
0
∂ℓ˜θ1e (u1, φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ2e
du1 + ℓ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )−
∫ φθ1e
0
∂
∂φθ2e
ℓ˜θ1e (t, φ
θ2
e )dt− v
2
e
= ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )− v
2
e = 0, ∀e ∈ E ,
(18b)
and
∂
∂fθ1p
L =
∑
e∈p
v1e − w
1
k − λ
1
p = 0, ∀p ∈ P , (19a)
∂
∂fθ2p
L =
∑
e∈p
v2e − w
2
k − λ
2
p = 0, ∀p ∈ P . (19b)
In addition, the complimentary slackness conditions for inequality constraints result in λ1pf
1
p = 0 and
λ2pf
2
p = 0 for all p ∈ P . Hence, for all k and p ∈ Pk, we have
ℓθip (f) =
∑
e∈p
ℓ˜θie (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
=
∑
e∈p
vie by (18)
= wik + λ
i
p. by (19)
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Thus, if fθip , f
θi
p′ > 0, using complimentary slackness, we get λ
θi
p = 0 and λ
θi
p′ = 0, which results in
ℓθip (f) = ℓ
θi
p′ (f) = w
i
k.
Additionally, for all p′′ ∈ Pk, where f
θi
p′′ = 0, we have λ
θi
p ≥ 0 (because of dual feasibility), which
results in
ℓθip′′(f) = w
i
k + λ
θi
p′′ ≥ w
i
k = ℓ
θi
p (f).
This is the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
B Proof of Proposition 5.2
Note that introducing the tolls τ˜θe (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) has the same impact on the routing game as replacing
the edge cost functions in the original heterogeneous routing game from ℓ˜θe(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) to ℓ˜
θ
e(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )+
τ˜θe (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ). Thanks to Lemma 4.3, the abstract game based upon this new heterogeneous routing
game admits the potential function V if
∂(ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) + τ˜
θ1
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ))
∂φθ2e
−
∂(ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ) + τ˜
θ2
e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e ))
∂φθ1e
= 0.
With rearranging the terms in this equality, we can extract the condition in the statement of the
proposition.
C Proof of Corollary 5.4
The proof can be seen as a direct application of the result of [58, Ch. 4] to Proposition 5.3. However,
let us show this fact following simple algebraic manipulations. Notice that
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Therefor, we get
∂τ˜e(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ2e
−
∂τ˜e(φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ1e
= fe(φ
θ2
e , φ
θ1
e )
=
∂ℓ˜θ2e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ1e
−
∂ℓ˜θ1e (φ
θ1
e , φ
θ2
e )
∂φθ2e
,
where the second equality directly follows from the definition of the mapping fe : R≥0 × R≥0 → R
in the statement of the corollary. Now, we can use Proposition 5.3 to show that a potential function
indeed exists.
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